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Abstract  
In view of the recent rise of China, this paper looks into one of the most important 
yet relatively overlooked ingredients of the Chinese success: industrial organisation. 
It will examine the case of the motorcycle industry, in which the rise of Chinese 
manufacturers even disrupted the established dominance of Japanese industry 
leaders. Adopting the modified version of the global value chain governance 
framework, this paper shows that the rise of China has been driven by a distinctive 
arm’s-length model of industrial organisation, which is in sharp contrast to the 
conventional captive model that has sustained the Japanese leadership.  
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Exploring the Sources of China’s Challenge to Japan: 
Models of Industrial Organisation in the Motorcycle Industry 
Mai Fujita 
1. Introduction 
The rise of the Japanese motorcycle industry after World War II was truly remarkable. 
Starting almost from scratch and fuelled by the growing demand for an inexpensive 
means of transport, and the engagement of a few hundred manufacturers, motorcycle 
production expanded rapidly in the 1950s (Alexander 2008). This was followed by the 
consolidation of manufacturers into four major companies: with the launch of the highly 
acclaimed Super Cub, Honda rapidly emerged as a global industry leader; and three 
other firms – namely Yamaha, Suzuki, and Kawasaki – successfully followed suit 
(Otahara 2000a). As early as 1965, Japan emerged as the world’s largest producer and 
exporter of motorcycles, virtually driving previous industry leaders in Great Britain, 
Germany, and France out of business (Smith 1981; Wezel and Lomi 2009). Following 
expansion of exports and foreign direct investment (FDI), the four Japanese companies 
accounted for as much as 70% of global production in 1996.1 
However, as so often happens, history repeated itself: by the end of the 1990s, Japanese 
dominance was being challenged by the rise of China. In 1993, its motorcycle 
production surpassed that of Japan, the former emerging as the world’s largest 
motorcycle producer. By 2006, China accounted for as much as 33% and 49% of global 
motorcycle sales and production respectively.2 The huge Chinese market was dominated 
by copies or slightly modified imitations of popular Japanese models that were 
produced by local manufacturers and sold at approximately 30% to 70% of the price of 
the originals (Ohara 2005a: 69). Meanwhile, Japanese manufacturers – for virtually the 
first time in the long history of their overseas operations – only managed to capture a 
minimal share in the Chinese market. As of the end of the 1990s, about twenty foreign 
joint venture firms in China, ten of which were established by the four Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers, together accounted for just 5% of the market (Ohara 2006a: 
21). Moreover, China’s challenge was not limited to the domestic market, as it expanded 
                                                   
1 Inclusive of production by foreign firms in receipt of technology transfer from the four Japanese 
companies (Otahara 2000a: 2–3). 
2 The author’s estimation based on Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (2007). 
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exports to Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America from the late 1990s onwards.3  
This paper addresses one of the critical factors that have sustained the prolonged 
dominance of Japanese manufacturers in the global motorcycle industry: industrial 
organisation. The substantial body of research on the Japanese automobile industry has 
shown how a distinctive model of industrial organisation characterised by long-term, 
trust-based supplier relationships has sustained product development and manufacturing 
performance (Smitka 1991; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Nishiguchi 1994; Dyer 1996; 
Fujimoto 1999). Emerging research into the Japanese motorcycle industry suggests that 
a similar form of industrial organisation has contributed to the high level of 
manufacturing performance of this sector (Boston Consulting Group 1975; Ohara 2001, 
2006a; Otahara 2006).  
The phenomenal rise of the Chinese motorcycle industry since the 1990s raises a series 
of questions. How did it manage to challenge the established position of Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers, which once seemed so unshakable? What form of industrial 
organisation enabled the Chinese to achieve their remarkable levels of price-based 
competitiveness? Did they emulate the Japanese model of industrial organisation but 
apply it in a better way, or did they develop a distinctive model of their own?  
Specifically, this paper addresses the following research question: What form of 
industrial organisation enabled Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to challenge 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers? It argues that rather than emulating the 
conventional Japanese model, Chinese motorcycle manufacturers developed a 
completely different form of industrial organisation. The resultant distinctive model 
enabled them to realise types of competiveness that differed significantly from those of 
the Japanese industry leaders, and allowed Chinese firms to thrive in a low-income 
portion of the global motorcycle market that was largely unexploited by the Japanese. 
The paper teases out the essence of the two contrasting models of industrial organisation 
that have emerged in Japan and China, and discusses their respective strengths and 
weaknesses, as well as trajectories of change, in an explicitly comparative manner. 
Primarily, the paper builds on existing empirical research into the Japanese and Chinese 
motorcycle industries. Conducted mostly by Japanese and Chinese academics, the bulk 
                                                   
3 China’s top ten motorcycle export destinations from 1998 to 2008 were Nigeria, the United States, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Argentina, Japan, Turkey, Mexico, Germany and Brazil (the author’s calculation 
based on Global Trade Information Services, Inc. 2012).  
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of such research has focussed on describing in depth the emerging patterns of industrial 
development, product development practices, and/or supplier systems in either or both 
of the two countries under study.4 Indeed, very few of the existing works systematically 
compared the emerging organisational patterns in Japan and China on the basis of a 
common theoretical framework, or explained why contrasting patterns have emerged in 
the two countries. One of the major obstacles in this regard has been the lack of a 
conceptual devise for systematically describing and explaining the patterns of industrial 
organisation, which are shaped by a myriad of factors – technological, strategic, 
institutional and social. Nevertheless, recent theoretical development in the field of 
global value chain (GVC) governance perhaps offers a way forward (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
The present paper utilises a modified version of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) framework of 
GVC governance to conceptualise the two models of industrial organisation, adopting a 
common theoretical framework and an explicitly comparative mode of analysis.  
Given that both models have evolved, the focus is on each of their conventional forms: 
the Japanese model in the 1970s up to the early 1990s, and the Chinese model in the 
1990s. Nevertheless, the paper also examines their respective transformations in the 
2000s on the basis of the literature as well as the author’s fieldwork in 2004, covering 
Honda’s major motorcycle component suppliers.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework. Sections 3 and 4 respectively conceptualise Japanese and Chinese models of 
industrial organisation in their conventional forms. Section 5 compares the two models 
and discusses trajectories of change. Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising its 
main findings, and identifies and discusses areas for future research.  
2. Theoretical Framework 
This section develops a theoretical framework for describing and explaining different 
forms of industrial organisation, which is based on a revised version of Gereffi et al.’s 
(2005) theory of GVC governance. The section begins by introducing the concept of 
value chain governance, followed by a consideration of five dominant governance types. 
It then discusses the two key variables that determine value chain governance. The 
                                                   
4 Existing empirical studies include Ohara (2001, 2004a, 2006b, 2006d), Otahara (2000a, 2000b, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2009a, 2009b), Hashino (2007), Demizu (1991, 2005), Tomizuka (2001), Otahara 
and Sugiyama (2005), and Alexander (2008) on Japan; and Ohara (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 
2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c), Ge and Fujimoto (2004, 2005), Matsuoka (2002), Sugiyama and 
Otahara (2002), and Otahara and Sugiyama (2005) on China. 
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section concludes by presenting a revised framework that uses these two variables to 
explain the emergence of the five aforementioned types of value chain governance.  
2.1 Industrial Organisation: Meaning and Type 
An industry comprises (groups of) firms engaged in one or more value-adding function 
that is required to bring products to market – typically referred to as a value chain 
(Sturgeon 2001). The literature on industrial organisation has evolved around the broad 
question of how the upstream to downstream functions surrounding a product are 
aligned to different (groups of) firms, and how relations between these firms are 
coordinated. Starting with the literature on large integrated corporations (Chandler 
1977) and transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979), through to theories on 
network forms of organisation (Powell 1990) and the GVC approach (Gereffi et al. 
2001; Schmitz 2004; Gereffi et al. 2005; Sturgeon 2008), the resultant large body of 
work has demonstrated the range of market and non-market mechanisms through which 
inter-firm relations are coordinated. These mechanisms – referred to by the GVC 
approach as types of value chain governance – are important because they influence 
competitive performance of industries and development prospects for local firms 
participating in value chains (Sturgeon 2002; Schmitz 2004).    
While there are myriad patterns of value chain governance, Gereffi et al. (2005) 
classified value chain governance into five dominant types, which were mapped onto a 
spectrum running from low to high levels of explicit coordination (Figure 1). At one end 
of the spectrum is the arm’s-length market in which transactions are mediated by market 
forces. At the other end of the spectrum there is a hierarchy in which coordination takes 
the form of an internal command structure within a vertically integrated corporation. In 
between these two extremes, there are intermediate or network forms of organisation 
that are neither based on markets nor a hierarchy (Powell 1990; Jones et al. 1997). In 
ascending order of explicit transactional governance, these are: 
 Modular chains, in which product standardisation reduces the frequency and 
intensity of interaction, as well as the level of mutual dependence between a lead 
firm and its suppliers   
 Relational chains, which are characterised by complex and intense interaction 
between mutually dependent parties  
 Captive chains, in which a powerful lead firm makes extensive intervention and 
exercises control over smaller and dependent suppliers 
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Figure 1. Types of Value Chain Governance 
Degree of Explicit 
Coordination Type Description 
Low 
  Market 
Arm’s-length transactions mediated by market 
forces 
 
 
 
 
Network 
Modular 
Product standardisation enables firms to 
exchange complex information without intense 
interaction or mutual dependence 
 Types Relational 
Intense two-way interaction and mutual 
dependence 
  Captive 
Lead firms make extensive intervention and 
exercise control over dependent suppliers 
 
High  Hierarchy Vertically-integrated organisation 
Source: The author, based on Gereffi et al. (2005). 
2.2 Determinants of Value Chain Governance  
Why do different forms of governance such as those discussed above exist? And under 
what circumstances do particular governance forms emerge? The strength of Gereffi et 
al.’s (2005) formulation of GVC governance theory is that it provides a simple and 
systematic device for answering these questions. Specifically, they seek to explain the 
dynamics of value chain governance in terms of three variables: (1) the complexity of 
information exchanged in a transaction; (2) the degree to which such information can be 
codified; and (3) the supplier’s capability level relative to the requirements of a 
transaction.  
However, the other side of the coin is that simplicity poses constraints on the 
explanatory power of the framework. Indeed, the limited number of the explanatory 
variables and the simple ways in which they are formulated limit the framework’s 
capacity to identify the defining features of organisational patterns emerging in Japan 
and China, and to explain their transformation over time. This study therefore follows 
the overall structure of Gereffi et al.’s framework, but makes the following adaptations.  
First, the present study’s framework incorporates lead firm capability in addition to 
supplier capability. Because the primary focus of Gereffi et al. (2005) is on the global 
value chains that are coordinated by major transnational corporations (TNCs), they 
implicitly assume that lead firms possess the sophisticated capability necessary to 
coordinate value chains. On the contrary, the present study does not take lead firm 
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capability as a given in view of the fact that it addresses the organisational model 
emerging in a developing country context. Rather, it acknowledges that a lead firm may 
be constrained by a shortage of capability in its attempt to establish certain types of 
chain governance.  
Second, rather than narrowly focussing on relative levels of capability, that is, whether 
or not supplier capability meets the level required by lead firms, the present study 
highlights the various types of capability that different governance mechanism models 
impose on both lead firms and suppliers. This modification makes it possible to examine 
fundamental differences in lead firm and supplier capabilities required by various 
governance mechanisms.  
Third, whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) concentrate on the codifiability of parameters 
exchanged in transactions, this study focuses on the degree to which these parameters 
are standardised, a related yet distinct concept. This is because degrees of product and 
process standardisation constitute one of the essential factors that differentiate the 
Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation in the motorcycle industry.5  
Fourth, for the sake of simplicity, the first two variables are grouped into one broader 
category: the nature of product and process parameters exchanged in transactions.  
The basic structure of this adapted framework is shown in Figure 2, in which value 
chain governance is determined by two variables: the nature of product and process 
parameters communicated in transactions; and the alignment of relevant capabilities 
within the industry. The following subsections examine the two variables individually.   
  
                                                   
5 This adaptation becomes critical in formulating the conditions under which captive chains emerge. 
Whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) focus on the codifiability of parameters in the form of lead firm 
instructions, the non-standard nature of product and process parameters turned out to be critical in 
explaining why Japanese motorcycle manufacturers had instituted explicit governance mechanisms 
in coordinating transactions with their suppliers.  
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Figure 2. Value Chain Governance: An Explanatory Framework 
 
Source: The author, adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005) and Langlois and Robertson (1995). 
2.2.1 The Nature of Product and Process Parameters 
The nature of product and process parameters determines the need for transactional 
governance. It is not the case that every transaction requires explicit coordination; the 
extent to which transactional governance is required depends primarily on the type of 
product being traded (in this case, motorcycle components). The specific focus will be 
on levels of complexity and degree of standardisation, both of which are influenced by 
factors such as technological innovation and changes in consumer demand.  
In respect of simple products, which also tend to be standardised, there is limited need 
for instituting explicit transactional governance: if components are simple and 
standardised, product/process parameters can be specified and communicated with ease. 
Supplier performance is easily observable in the form of delivered outputs and thus 
detailed monitoring mechanisms are not required. Moreover, as standard products do 
not require transaction-specific investment, there is no need to implement safeguards 
against the risks of opportunism (Williamson 1979). Standard products can also be 
produced by a range of suppliers, sold to a variety of lead firms, or produced for stock 
and supplied as necessary (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The need for coordination increases as products become complex and differentiated, 
that is, as they start to take on new demands beyond price level (Schmitz 2006; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2008). Examples include differentiated components that are 
more difficult to design and/or manufacture; higher quality levels; tighter delivery 
requirements in terms of either frequency or punctuality; and additional functional 
The nature of 
product/process 
parameters
The aligment of 
relevant capabilities  
within the industry
Value chain 
governance
Technological shift,  
changes in consumer 
demand, etc.
Acquisition of new 
capabilities by 
incumbents; entry of 
new firms
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requirements (e.g. suppliers take on design responsibilities in addition to 
manufacturing). Implementing new requirements such as these often constitutes an 
additional burden with regard to the communication of product and/or process 
parameters between the lead firm and its suppliers. It also necessitates additional 
mechanisms to ensure that parameters are adhered to, for example, detailed monitoring 
(Schmitz 2006). 
The need for explicit governance also depends on the extent to which parameters are 
standardised. On the one hand, non-standard parameters require explicit coordination 
because they incur additional coordination costs and transaction-specific investment in 
physical and/or human resources (Williamson 1979). This is particularly the case for 
products with integral design architecture. Because such products are characterised by 
complex mapping from functional elements to physical components and tightly coupled 
interfaces among interacting physical components, they call for fine-tuning between the 
whole product and its component parts if overall product performance is to be 
maximised (Ulrich 1995; Baldwin and Clark 2000). Designing these products requires 
the coordination of detailed design tasks (Ulrich 1995), and their manufacture 
necessitates transaction-specific investment, both of which call for explicit governance 
mechanisms to be in place.  
On the other hand, even when the product is complex, industry-wide product and/or 
process standards may reduce the need for explicit governance (Gereffi et al. 2005). In 
industries that produce products with modular architecture, standards make it possible 
to communicate product and/or process parameters without intense interaction, which 
releases firms from being locked into particular trading relationships (Langlois and 
Robertson 1992, 1995).  
2.2.2 The Alignment of Relevant Capabilities  
The need for transactional governance, however, does not mean that such mechanisms 
can necessarily be implemented in practice. This is where the second variable of the 
alignment of relevant capabilities within the industry comes into play. Governance 
means that a given firm enforces parameters over other firms, a dynamic that demands 
the ability to wield power (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008). The relative power relations 
between a lead firm and its suppliers, in turn, are determined primarily by the types and 
levels of capability enjoyed by the respective parties (Sturgeon 2008; Schmitz 2006; 
Palpacuer 2000). 
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A lead firm’s capacity to impose parameters on its suppliers usually stems from their 
core competencies in strategic value chain functions (Palpacuer 2000; Schmitz 2006). In 
capital-intensive sectors such as the automotive industry, such strategic functions 
typically include product development, marketing, and manufacturing of core 
components. These functions often constitute the key sources of competitive advantage 
enjoyed by the lead firm because they require knowledge- and experienced-based assets 
that are difficult for others to imitate, and because they provide economies of scale for 
the firms that control these functions (Palpacuer 2000: 378).  
A lead firm’s control over strategic value chain functions matters because it tends to 
create two types of dependence on the part of the suppliers. First, lead firm control over 
strategic functions leaves suppliers with non-core functions (Palpacuer 2000), rendering 
them functionally dependent on the lead firm in marketing their products. Second, 
because dominance in respect of product, marketing, and/or branding often enables lead 
firms to gain a high degree of control over the market (Gereffi 1999; Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2000), they often overwhelm suppliers with huge purchasing power (Sturgeon 
2008), rendering them financially dependent.  
The size of orders takes on particular importance in industries in which product and 
process parameters are non-standard. Because non-standard products often impose the 
additional cost of product-specific investment in physical and human resources, a lead 
firm will face difficulty enforcing non-standard parameters on its suppliers unless orders 
are large enough to make production economically viable.6   
However, it is necessary to analyse lead firm competency in relative terms. Because 
power is relational, suppliers may also acquire it by building core competencies, that is, 
technical or service capabilities that are difficult to replace and become indispensable to 
the lead firm (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008; Palpacuer 2000). Suppliers can also gain 
the generic capability to assume responsibility for a bundle of functions, such as product 
design, process development, purchasing, and production, which enables them to serve 
a diverse pool of customers and switch customers if necessary (Sturgeon 2008). In 
contrast, where suppliers only possess capabilities that are easily substituted and/or are 
embedded in relations with specific customers, the lead firm retains the capacity to 
choose and replace suppliers, thus keeping supplier power under control (ibid.).  
                                                   
6 Sturgeon et al. (2008) corroborate this point in arguing that the concentrated structure of the car 
manufacturing industry helps each firm to impose its own idiosyncratic standards on suppliers.  
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2.3 The Revised Framework 
Table 1 shows how the five governance types mentioned in Section 2.1 can be explained 
in terms of different combinations of the two variables outlined in the previous 
subsection. When product and process parameters are simple and standardised, 
market-based chains emerge. This type of chain makes limited capability demand of 
lead firm and suppliers alike, the minimum requirements being that they possess routine 
assembly capability and routine component manufacturing capability respectively. 
When industry-wide standards of compatibility enable complex parameters to be 
exchanged without explicit coordination, modular chains emerge whereby suppliers 
acquire generic manufacturing capacity and related service capabilities that enable them 
to serve multiple lead firms simultaneously. On the other hand, while the minimum 
requirement of the lead firm is routine assembly capability using mutually compatible 
components sourced from suppliers, modular chains enable it to focus on creation, 
penetration and defence of markets for its end products (Sturgeon 2002).  
As product and process parameters become complex and non-standard, three types of 
chain governance may emerge depending on the alignment of relevant capabilities. The 
first case is one in which the lead firm and its suppliers are equipped with 
complementary competencies that cannot easily be sourced elsewhere. Such a situation 
gives rise to a relational chain whereby the lead firm and its suppliers are engaged in 
intense two-way interaction; the two parties are mutually dependent and the power 
relation is symmetrical (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The second case is characterised by substantial asymmetry in capability levels between 
a large, competent lead firm and smaller, less competent suppliers. Competence and 
power asymmetry lead to a captive chain whereby the lead firm engages in extensive 
intervention, such as active monitoring and technical assistance; while suppliers develop 
their capabilities – typically, in a narrow range of tasks – under the lead firm’s guidance 
(Schmitz 2004, 2006).  
The last case is one in which limited available external capability makes outsourcing 
unfeasible, meaning that the lead firm is compelled to conduct the required function(s) 
in-house, that is, to create a hierarchy. A hierarchy may also result from cases of 
substantial asymmetry in competence levels (i.e. the second case discussed above) but 
where the lead firm is either unwilling or unable to engage in extensive intervention.  
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Table 1. Types of Chain Governance and their Determinants 
  
Product/ 
Process 
Parameters 
Lead Firm Capability Supplier Capability 
Market Simple 
No specific requirements beyond routine manufacturing/assembly 
capabilities 
Modular 
Complex/  
Standard 
A minimum of routine assembly 
capability suffices. 
Lead firms usually focus on 
creation, penetration and 
maintenance of markets for end 
products. 
Generic manufacturing and 
related service capabilities. 
Relational 
Complex/ 
Non-standard 
Lead firms and suppliers possess complementary competencies that 
are hard to substitute. 
Captive 
Capacity to exercise dominance 
over suppliers, which usually 
stems from control over 
strategic chain functions. 
A minimum of the basic ability to 
engage in a narrow range of 
simple tasks is required. Suppliers 
develop capabilities in accordance 
with the lead firm’s interventions. 
Hierarchical 
Capability to conduct the 
value-adding functions in 
question. 
Supplier capability is withheld. 
Source: Adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005), Sturgeon (2002), Langlois and Robertson (1995), 
Sturgeon et al. (2008), Schmitz (2006), Sturgeon (2008), and Palpacuer (2000). 
3. The Captive Japanese Model 
The captive model of industrial organisation has been one of the key factors behind the 
prolonged leadership of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers since the 1960s. This 
section discusses the origins and distinguishing features of this model in accordance 
with the framework introduced in Section 2.  
3.1 Complex and Non-standard Parameters  
In the Japanese motorcycle industry, lead firms have traditionally organised relations 
with suppliers that reflected the nature of the product and process parameters they 
sought to enforce. Critical in this regard was the nature of the dominant design – the old 
yet highly successful Super Cub model. Over the five decades following its launch in 
1958, this model shaped product and process parameters in the industry.  
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Up to the mid-1950s, two types of product prevailed in the Japanese motorcycle market, 
both of which were characterised by simple and standardised product parameters.7 One 
was represented by poor quality imitations of imported British and German models. 
Leading experts on the history of the Japanese motorcycle industry note that 
domestically manufactured models of the period were mediocre in terms of engineering 
precision, quality and product performance, all aspects that largely failed to compete 
with foreign-made vehicles (Demizu 1991: 67; Tomizuka 2001: 100).  
The other type of product was the motorised bicycle, which, again, imitated models 
imported from Europe. Since such vehicles could be produced by simply attaching an 
external two-stroke engine to a bicycle (Otaraha 2000a), which itself had modular 
design architecture (Galvin and Morkel 2001), fine-tuning in terms of component 
integration was not required. Both types of product were produced by a large number of 
assemblers and suppliers that operated on an arm’s-length transaction basis (Demizu 
1991; Alexander 2008).  
Honda’s launch of the Super Cub in 1958 marked a major technological breakthrough. 
Unlike the copies of imported European motorcycles or motorised bicycles that had 
preceded it, the Super Cub was conceived and designed by Honda exclusively to meet 
the demand of small Japanese businesses to deliver goods (Pascale 1984; Otahara 
2000b). Featuring landmark technological innovations such as a four-stroke engine, 
overhead valves, an automatic centrifugal clutch, and an electric starter, the model 
recorded remarkable levels of capacity, speed and fuel efficiency that substantially 
exceeded world standard levels of the period (Demizu 1991). The safe and user-friendly 
appearance of the model, together with its affordable price also appealed strongly to 
Japanese consumers (Pascale 1984). Most notably, Honda designed the Super Cub by 
means of integral architecture so that all its components were customised to this 
particular model. Not a single Super Cub component was used in common with Honda’s 
other models (Otahara and Sugiyama 2005).  
This highly successful model not only led to the closure of nearly two hundred Japanese 
firms engaged in the production of imitation motorcycles, but also enabled Honda to 
infiltrate and eventually dominate the North American and European markets 
                                                   
7 Debate around the Japanese motorcycle industry up to the mid-1950s is based on the 
commentaries of Tomizuka (2001), Demizu (1991), and Alexander (2008). As Alexander (2008) 
points out, the nature of the product, mode of production, and form of industrial organisation at this 
time was surprisingly similar to the situation in the Chinese motorcycle industry in the 1990s.   
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(Christensen 2002; Demizu 2005). Fifty years on, the basic production technology 
remains unchanged (Ohara 2006b). Technological shifts observed in the automobile 
industry, such as standardisation of vehicle platforms and modularisation (Humphrey 
2000; Sako 2005; Takeishi and Fujimoto 2005), have so far not been implemented in the 
motorcycle industry (Ohara 2006b: 70). The Super Cub continues to be one of Honda’s 
most popular models produced globally8 and is used by other motorcycle manufacturers 
as a benchmark for the development of new products (Ohara 2006b). Considering the 
exceptionally high market shares this model has maintained in Japan and abroad over an 
extended period, the Super Cub may be seen as a typical example of a dominant design 
(Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Abernathy and Clark 1985; Teece 1986).  
The emergence of the Super Cub as a dominant model significantly transformed the 
nature of innovation in the industry. Subsequently, Honda and the three other companies 
that successfully followed suit – namely, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki – opted to 
launch proprietary models incorporating new component technology, changes in 
specifications, and/or design modifications, aimed at improved product performance 
and/or adaptation to meet the consumer demand of Japanese and overseas markets 
(Demizu 1991; Otahara and Sugiyama 2005; Ohara 2006b). Every time new models 
were launched, motorcycle manufacturers renewed the designs of the whole vehicle as 
well as those of individual components (Otahara and Sugiyama 2005). Given the 
integral product architecture, incremental product innovations of this sort called for 
intricate fine-tuning between components (Ohara 2006d; Otahara 2009a). Thus, product 
parameters became complex and non-standard. 
The emergence of the dominant design also lent increasing importance to process 
innovation for incremental improvements in productivity (Abernathy and Utterback 
1978). Reflecting the integral design architecture, Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
made themselves liable for provision to their consumers of a quality guarantee for the 
product system as a whole (Otahara 2009a, 2009b). Therefore, they took the lead in 
instituting their own engineering standards9 and ensuring that common targets for the 
achievement of high levels of quality, costs and delivery (QCD) were pursued 
simultaneously for all of the components of a product. Accordingly, process 
requirements also became complex and non-standard. 
                                                   
8 Honda’s cumulative production of the Cub series reached 60 million units by 2008 
(http://world.honda.com/news/2008/c080521Cub-Series/, accessed 16 September 2010), which was 
roughly one-third of the company’s cumulative global production of motorcycles.  
9 For example, the Honda Engineering Standard (HES) includes component dimensions, material 
specifications, and details of the requisite processing. 
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3.2 Lead Firm Concentration of Capabilities 
The second key variable that determines the pattern of industrial organisation is the 
structure of relevant capabilities. With the closure of the hitherto numerous assemblers 
of imitation motorcycles and motorised bicycles, the Japanese motorcycle industry grew 
highly concentrated. By the 1970s, the four emergent major motorcycle manufacturers 
had gained dominance of the growing domestic market and, subsequently, global sales 
via exports and FDI (Otahara 2000a).  
Each of these four motorcycle manufacturers developed a pyramidal, hierarchical 
network of suppliers with the lead firm at the top of the pyramid (Figure 3). As was the 
case in the car industry (Sturgeon et al. 2008), the need for customised components led 
each manufacturer to develop supply networks of its own and to enforce its 
idiosyncratic product standards on the suppliers. Large market shares meant that 
manufacturers were able to place orders that were sufficiently large to sustain small 
suppliers.10 
Figure 3. Hierarchical Organisational Model in the Japanese Motorcycle Industry 
 
Source: The author.  
These four powerful motorcycle manufacturers virtually monopolised capabilities in the 
                                                   
10 In 1981, production volumes of Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki in Japan were 2.9, 2.5, 1.5 
and 0.5 million units, respectively (Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 1996). 
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industry. Equipped as they were with thorough knowledge of product development, 
production and marketing, they had the capability to conduct most core value chain 
functions in-house (Ohara 2006b). Particularly in the domain of product development 
and manufacturing, capabilities possessed by Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
extended from the whole vehicle to most individual parts, even those outsourced to 
external suppliers.11 The only exceptions were a limited number of components 
requiring specialised product and production technologies that the motorcycle 
manufacturers did not possess, for example, clutches, carburettors, and tyres (Otahara 
2006). 
Moreover, the intrinsic core of the capability possessed by Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers was not confined to capability to conduct individual functions along the 
motorcycle value chain; even more important was their capability to integrate various 
value chain functions from product development to manufacturing and marketing. 
Indeed, effective use of market information for coordinated improvement in product and 
process engineering acted as an important channel for Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers to achieve incremental innovations that helped them to realise high 
quality, better manufacturability, and improved productivity.12  
The sophisticated capabilities possessed by Japanese motorcycle manufacturers meant 
that a relatively narrow range of tasks had to be outsourced. Value chains included two 
types of supplier with different capability requirements. At the heart of this supply 
network were suppliers that had acquired proprietary component technologies that lead 
firms did not possess. As discussed above, lead firms’ control over much of the 
component technology meant that such suppliers were extremely limited. These 
suppliers collaborated closely with the lead firm in the process of product development 
by undertaking detailed design of core components (Otahara 2006). The remaining 
suppliers, which were in the majority, were in the peripheral position of providers of 
non-core components. These firms were expected to provide external manufacturing 
capacity rather than complementary competencies, that is, the manufacture of 
                                                   
11 As Japanese manufacturers imitated European motorcycle designs in the early years of their 
development, they sought to absorb both the overall product design and individual component 
technologies (Otahara and Sugiyama 2005).  
12 Ohara (2006d). Also corroborated by lecture by a former engineer of Honda Motor Co., Ltd. for 
the Asian Motorcycle Industry research project organised by the Institute of Developing Economies, 
6 August 2004.  
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components in accordance with drawings developed and supplied by a lead firm.13  
Most suppliers were closely aligned to one of the four major motorcycle 
manufacturers.14 Suppliers of core components in particular developed capital and 
personnel ties with manufacturers and constituted key members of their corporate 
groups referred to as keiretsu.15 Japanese motorcycle manufactures, with the exception 
of Kawasaki, also established supplier associations (kyoryokukai). For example, Honda 
developed supplier associations in two locations where its motorcycle factories were 
located.16 By organising suppliers located in these areas, including those of non-core 
components, Honda provided technical and managerial guidance in order to bring their 
competence up to the required levels (Otahara 2007).  
In short, the industry adopted a highly concentrated structure, with lead firms 
dominating core capabilities.   
3.3 Captive Governance 
The need for suppliers dedicated to providing a stable supply of large quantities of 
high-quality, customised components, combined with asymmetrical alignment of 
capabilities, resulted in captive governance. Under this form of organisation, the lead 
firm practiced a high degree of control and intervention over smaller and dependent 
suppliers in order to encourage them to develop lead firm-specific competencies.  
For the suppliers’ part, entering into Japanese chain meant guaranteed long-term 
business. Suppliers could expect large orders over the long term because, once 
cemented, lead firm–supplier relations were maintained indefinitely other than in truly 
exceptional circumstances.17 Where supplier capabilities fell short of the required levels, 
                                                   
13 In the early years of its motorcycle operations, Honda was known for its dependence on in-house 
manufacturing of components as this tended to be more efficient than outsourcing to external 
suppliers (Otahara 2000b). As the company expanded production in Japan and overseas, it developed 
its supplier networks and expanded outsourcing. As of the 2000s, Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers outsourced 80% of components in terms of cost (Otahara 2006).  
14 There were also independent suppliers not affiliated to specific motorcycle manufacturers (Ohara 
2006b).  
15 For example, the Honda Group consisted of 57 member companies, including 23 component 
suppliers, sales firms, engineering firms, and a research and development (R&D) unit (IRC 2009).  
16 Interestingly, Honda is known for not having established a supplier association for its car business 
(Sako 1996); however, the company has two supplier associations in respect of motorcycle 
production: Yurin-kai in Kumamoto and Satsuki-kai in Hamamatsu (IRC 2009). 
17 As corroborated by data provided by Otahara (2006). 
17 
 
lead firms provided various forms of assistance to bring them up to standard. This was 
particularly necessary in the early stages of industrial development when lead firms 
faced a shortage of suppliers with the ability to meet their requirements (Hashino 2007).  
Lead firms also provided enabling conditions for suppliers by mitigating and absorbing 
the risks of customer-specific investment associated with designing and manufacturing 
customised components. Such risk was mitigated as competencies possessed by lead 
firms significantly reduced the failure rate of new product development projects (Ohara 
2004a). Risks were also absorbed because lead firms fully or partially bore the cost of 
customer-specific investment in developing prototypes, and manufacturing dies and 
moulds (Ohara 2001). 
The other side of the coin, however, was that suppliers were virtually locked into 
relations with particular customers and were under pressure to reach the goals and 
specifications set by lead firms. The lead firm typically informed suppliers of its 
business plans, as well as detailed instructions and specifications based on its own 
idiosyncratic product and process standards. Suppliers were even advised of the lead 
firm’s future product strategy at an early stage (Ohara 2001). Accordingly, suppliers 
were expected to invest in locations, machinery and human resources specific to their 
customer’s requirements; devote most of their resources and efforts to achieve goals and 
fulfil plans set by the former; and submit to close monitoring of their performance 
against lead firm requirements.  
Suppliers were also required to disclose detailed information to lead firms on their 
internal operations, extending to detailed cost data as the basis for joint problem-solving 
exercises in the quest for possible ways of reducing costs at source (Ohara 2001, 
2004a).18 Gains made from such joint efforts were in principle divided between the lead 
firm and the supplier in accordance with the rules of reasonable profit sharing (Ohara 
2001), as was the case in the Japanese car industry (Nishiguchi and Brookfield 1997). 
However, in effect, suppliers ceded their autonomy to independently negotiate the 
proportion of rent that had accrued from their own incremental process innovation, and 
sacrificed their ability to search for new customers. 
Over time, suppliers developed the narrow range of manufacturing capabilities 
necessary to process the components in accordance with lead firm specifications and 
requirements (Otahara 2006). Where suppliers acquired complementary competencies 
                                                   
18 These initiatives are often referred to as value analysis (VA) and value engineering (VE).  
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in component technology that the lead firm had to depend on, they began to collaborate 
closely with their customers in the development of new product designs. In such cases, 
lead firm–supplier relationships exhibited features of relational governance, that is, 
intense two-way information flow. Yet, the lead firm’s control over product and 
production technology in this industry meant that such instances were extremely rare; 
even in comparison with the country’s car industry (Otahara 2006) – a classic example 
of captive organisation (Sturgeon et al. 2008). The majority of the suppliers were in 
subordinate positions as suppliers of non-core components.19  
The captive model of industrial organisation was indeed one of the key factors behind 
the success of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers in launching proprietary models and 
manufacturing them to high standards. The model served Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers well in their attempts to conquer the world market – but only until the 
early 1990s; by then, they faced new challenges arising in the developing world (Ohara 
2006b). The details of these challenges and the subsequent trajectories of organisational 
change are discussed in detail in Section 5.  
4. The Market-based Chinese Model 
In the Chinese motorcycle industry, there has emerged a form of industrial organisation 
strikingly different from the conventional Japanese model discussed in the previous 
section. The present section conceptualises the Chinese model as it emerged in the 
1990s – the industry’s initial fast-growth phase. While the Chinese motorcycle industry 
consists of diverse players who cater for different sections of a huge market, the focus is 
on large indigenous manufacturers,20 both state-owned and private, which, at the end of 
the 1990s, accounted for roughly 60-70% of the market (Ohara 2006a: 27).  
 
                                                   
19 According to the survey of motorcycle component manufacturers in Hamamatsu – one of Japan’s 
two main centres of motorcycle production along with Kumamoto – conducted jointly by 
Hamamatsu Credit Association and the Research Institute for Shinkin Central Bank in 2003, 68.1% 
of the 119 respondents considered their bargaining power vis-à-vis their largest customers to be 
weak (Otahara 2006: 112).  
20 According to Ohara (2004a), these firms correspond to the second of the three categories of 
motorcycle manufacturer in China. The first consists of foreign-invested manufacturers that produce 
expensive proprietary models; and the third comprises indigenous small-size manufacturers that 
focus almost exclusively on assembling low-priced copies of foreign models by externally sourcing 
standardised components. Ohara (2004a: 27) notes that over time, the patterns of competition 
observed among motorcycle manufacturers in the first and third categories have tended to converge 
towards those that are evident among manufacturers in the second category.  
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4.1 Low-Quality and De Facto Standardisation 
As the discussion in the previous section demonstrated, a centralised form of industrial 
organisation long persisted in the Japanese motorcycle industry primarily because of 
integral product architecture. The Chinese succeeded in developing a new organisational 
model precisely because they succeeded in breaking such a constraint. However, this 
process did not follow the common route of industry standards being established by 
dominant firms or international organisations (Gereffi et al 2005; Galvin and Morkel 
2001). As will be explained in detail below, de facto standards of component 
compatibility emerged in the Chinese motorcycle industry endogenously as a result of 
uncoordinated actions by numerous firms within the sector.  
Unlike manufacturers’ proprietary models that prevailed in the Japanese motorcycle 
industry, those produced by Chinese companies in the 1990s were mainly low-quality 
and low-priced copies, or slightly modified imitations of a limited number of popular 
Japanese models. The designs of roughly a dozen of the latter, which had been 
introduced into a number of Chinese state-owned motorcycle manufacturers under 
technological licensing agreements in the 1980s, were widely shared and replicated by 
numerous newly emerging private manufacturers by the 1990s (Ohara 2001; Ge and 
Fujimoto 2004). Among such Japanese models, the most popular was again Honda’s 
highly renowned Super Cub, this and several other models becoming de facto standards 
in the Chinese industry. While the number of models registered with the Chinese 
authorities increased rapidly, reaching 18,000 by the end of 2000 (Ohara 2005b: 58), 
those marketed under either Chinese or imitated Japanese brands were mainly copies of 
a dozen most popular Japanese models, sometimes incorporating minor functional 
and/or cosmetic modifications. 
Clearly, de facto standardisation of this sort occurred due to demand-side conditions 
specific to the Chinese market. First, it took place under weak protection of intellectual 
property rights (Ohara 2006a). Second, Chinese consumers prioritised low prices over 
quality.21 The fact that the Chinese authorities prohibited the use of motorcycles in large 
cities and on highways (ibid.) further reinforced this tendency.  
De facto standardisation and low quality requirements brought about corresponding 
changes in the nature of innovations, which were now limited in both degree and scope. 
As duplicative imitation of Japanese models became widespread, product development 
                                                   
21 Ohara (2004a: 67) notes that many consumers in China do not care as long as motorcycles run. 
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and marketing – which formed the intrinsic core of lead firm activity in the Japanese 
motorcycle industry – assumed little significance. In terms of product development, 
Chinese lead firms did not generally opt for the kind of whole product system renewal 
that had occurred in the Japanese motorcycle industry. Although many of the large 
manufacturers did engage in modifications to Japanese base models, these tended to be 
minor, usually consisting of changes in only one or two components or varying 
combinations of existing components (Ohara 2004a: 49). It also made little sense for 
firms to engage in extensive marketing or branding activities for products that were 
essentially imitations. In the domain of production, the low expectations of Chinese 
consumers meant that lead firms faced limited pressure to engage in quality 
improvement.  
The above changes in the nature of innovation substantially reduced the need for 
explicit coordination between the lead firm and its suppliers, although – as will be 
argued below – the need for coordination was not eliminated completely. Lead firm 
requirements on suppliers focussed predominantly on low prices; and because products 
basically followed de facto standard designs, limited fine-tuning between component 
specifications was called for. The lead firm and its suppliers could therefore engage in 
motorcycle assembly and component manufacturing respectively largely (but, as we 
shall, see not completely) without intense interaction. 
It should be noted that de facto standardisation must be distinguished from 
modularisation, their apparent similarity notwithstanding.22 Since the Chinese did not 
change the design architecture of motorcycles, full compatibility of components could 
only be guaranteed insofar as they were manufactured precisely in accordance with the 
original drawings of the Japanese base models. However, this has not been the case: as 
will be discussed in depth in Section 4.3, uncoordinated duplicative imitation in China 
has frequently produced components that are not strictly compatible. De facto 
standardisation in the absence of a shift in design architecture therefore needs to be 
differentiated from product modularity, which ensures full compatibility between the 
component modules comprising the product.  
 
                                                   
22 The apparent resemblance has led several authors to describe on-going practices in the Chinese 
motorcycle industry as modular production (Matsuoka 2002; Pham Truong Hoang 2007). See Paper 
II for detailed discussion on this issue. 
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4.2 Wide Distribution of Basic Manufacturing and Reverse Engineering 
Capabilities 
Up to the early 1990s, the Chinese motorcycle industry was dominated by a small 
number of large state-owned manufacturers such as Jialing and Qingqi, which until then 
had been consistently ranked as the largest in the country (Ohara 2006a). After the 
launching of market-oriented economic reforms in China in 1979, these state-owned 
manufacturers shifted their production from military armaments to motorcycles with the 
introduction of Japanese technology under formalised licensing agreements (ibid.). 
They subsequently laid the foundations of the industry by developing integrated 
production systems and supply networks, and training a large pool of engineers and 
managers (ibid.). 
De facto standardisation radically transformed the landscape of the Chinese motorcycle 
industry by significantly lowering the entry barrier for both manufacturers and suppliers. 
Instead of playing the role of integrators of various value chain functions (as was the 
case with their Japanese counterparts) lead firms could now purchase and assemble 
standard components readily available on the market. This meant that the minimum 
requirement of them was the capacity to assemble components. Likewise, suppliers no 
longer had to invest in equipment, human resources, or skills specific to individual 
customers; in order to operate as a motorcycle component supplier, simple reverse 
engineering capabilities in terms of reproducing existing components and routine 
manufacturing now sufficed.  
As a result of the engagement of a large number of companies – including many private 
firms that had hitherto operated in unrelated fields – in assembly and component 
production, the structure of the Chinese motorcycle industry became highly fragmented. 
The number of motorcycle manufacturers increased in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching 
140 in 1997 (Ohara 2001: 7). In 1999, the market shares of the largest 10 and 20 
manufacturers were 53.1% and 68.0% respectively (ibid.). The industrial structure was 
also fluid, as demonstrated by recurrent changes in the names of top companies (Ohara 
2006c). Jialing saw its market share decline throughout the 1990s until it accounted for 
only 6.7% of the total number of motorcycles produced in China in 2001 (Ohara 2004a). 
Meanwhile, newly emerging manufacturers rapidly expanded their production. From the 
mid-1990 onwards, numerous private firms also entered into the manufacturing of 
motorcycle components, absorbing a large number of engineers, technicians and 
managers who had previously worked for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in mechanical, 
22 
 
steel or chemical industries (Ohara 2004b). 
However, both motorcycle manufacturers and suppliers only possessed basic levels of 
technological capability. Many of the newly emerging private motorcycle manufacturers 
in particular had limited knowledge of overall product systems or individual component 
technology, and thus started operations by purchasing and assembling components 
available in the market (Ohara 2004b). For example, Zongshen, one of the three major 
private local motorcycle manufacturers based in the southwestern city of Chongqing – 
the main centre of motorcycle production in China, was established in 1992 by a 
ceramic engineer (ibid.).  
Whereas large state-owned motorcycle manufacturers had opted to develop supply 
networks of their own in the 1980s, lead firms and suppliers grew increasingly 
independent of each other in the 1990s, a tendency that led to the emergence of 
dispersed supply networks, meaning that suppliers were no longer tied to particular lead 
firms (Figure 4). Ohara’s (2001: 17) interviews with eighteen suppliers of core 
components to the three major motorcycle manufacturers at the end of 1990s found that 
suppliers on average traded with 14.9 customers; and the largest customer on average 
accounted for just 40.5% of the sales of suppliers’ main products.23 Lead firms were not 
dependent on particular suppliers either, manufacturers normally maintaining multiple – 
usually three or more – suppliers of each type of component (Ohara 2001: 18). 
Figure 4. Dispersed Organisational Model in the Chinese Motorcycle Industry 
 
Source: The author, with reference to Ohara (2001, 2006c).   
                                                   
23 Since this figure only represents suppliers’ main products, their overall dependence on the main 
customer was most probably much lower.  
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4.3 Arm’s-Length Transactions Mediated by Market Forces 
De facto standardisation and low quality requirements combined with the wide 
distribution of basic reverse engineering and manufacturing capabilities led Chinese 
motorcycle manufacturers to make extensive use of market forces in doing business 
with their suppliers. Many lead firms as well as suppliers engaged in arm’s-length 
transactions characterised by intense competition, frequent switching of partners on the 
basis of price, and low levels of explicit coordination. Specific patterns of transactional 
governance, however, varied according to the type of transaction. In this subsection, we 
examine how transactional governance worked in practice. 
Let us start with the simplest case, namely, instances in which Chinese firms simply 
replicated existing Japanese models. While such practice was typically seen among 
small- and medium-size manufacturers, large manufacturers often adopted this approach 
for a certain range of their products (Ohara 2005b). In these instances, de facto 
standardisation virtually eliminated the need for explicit coordination. Suppliers 
engaged in duplicative imitation of components independently of the manufacturer, who, 
in turn, purchased standard components readily available on the market. The resulting 
pattern of transactional governance assumed an arm’s-length form in which many lead 
firms and suppliers competed intensely on the basis of price.  
However, as discussed in Section 4.1, de facto standardisation did not completely 
eliminate the need for lead firm–supplier coordination. The fact that integral design 
architecture was maintained meant that full compatibility of components could only be 
ensured insofar as they were manufactured precisely in accordance with the original 
drawings of the dominant models, which was frequently not the case. Since suppliers 
adopted different measuring methods and varying degrees of precision in reproducing 
design drawings of components available on the market, repeated duplicative imitation 
of a given dominant model often gave rise to components that were not compatible with 
each other (Ge and Fujimoto 2004). Non-compatibility problems were typically 
addressed in an ad hoc manner by making ex post adjustments (ibid.). Even such 
adjustments did not render components strictly compatible but was sufficient to make 
them assemblable. This means that Chinese firms compromised on product quality for 
the sake of reducing the need for explicit inter-firm coordination. 
Let us proceed to cases in which modifications were made to Japanese models – a 
practice typically observed among larger Chinese motorcycle manufacturers. Where 
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changes were made to parts that functionally interact little with other components (such 
as plastic covers, tyres, speedometers, and shock absorbers), the story was essentially 
the same as the instances of duplicative imitation referred to above. Since the absence of 
coordination between adjacent components did not substantially affect the overall 
performance of a product, arm’s-length transaction with little explicit coordination 
prevailed, although ad hoc ex post adjustments were often necessary. Suppliers prepared 
modified designs independent of their customers, intentionally keeping the interface 
with other components standardised so that they could be sold to a large number of 
unspecified customers (Sugiyama and Otahara 2002). In turn, manufacturers sought to 
purchase and assemble varieties of components that were available on the market 
instead of generating own-product concepts and basic product design (Otahara and 
Sugiyama 2005). 
Where modifications were made to core functional components that required 
coordination with related parts in order to yield superior product performance (e.g. 
engine components, carburettors, and silencers), the story was more complicated. In 
theory, such transactions required a flow of tacit information to facilitate fine-tuning 
between components as well as reconciliation of competing incentives to overcome the 
risks of customer-specific investment (Williamson 1979). However, in practice, the 
realities of market conditions in China, the limited capabilities of lead firms, and the 
lack of safeguards against the risks of opportunism prevented both lead firms and 
suppliers from committing themselves to the development of non-standard designs that 
adopted customised components.  
On the one hand, in a market where few consumers were willing to pay a high premium 
for sophisticated designs, consumer demand changed rapidly, and intellectual property 
rights were only weakly protected, lead firms investing in non-standard designs faced 
substantial risks. Instead of mitigating and absorbing the risks of model-specific 
investments, as had been the case with Japanese motorcycle manufacturers, they 
switched the risks to their suppliers by outsourcing the design and manufacture of 
mutually interacting components to more than one supplier without making a 
commitment to bear the cost of developing prototypes or investing in dies and moulds 
(Ohara 2001).  
On the other hand, suppliers receiving orders for developing modified component 
designs faced the following two types of risk (Ohara 2001, 2004a). One was the 
possibility that the new product development project would fail (e.g. if it was terminated 
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before the new model was launched, or if it was launched but production fell short of 
the minimum efficient scale). Given the volatile nature of the Chinese market and the 
weak sales capabilities of motorcycle manufacturers, such risks were substantial.24 The 
other type of risk to suppliers concerned the possibility that the manufacturer might 
adopt a competitor’s component design, a real possibility insofar as many lead firms 
engaged in the multiple sourcing of components (Ohara 2001).  
Faced with considerable risks, suppliers naturally avoided making customer-specific 
investment wherever possible. Instead of investing in customised dies and moulds, they 
often sought to utilise existing equipment to develop prototypes for modified 
component designs (Ohara 2001). While this served as a safeguard against the risks of 
non-purchase by the lead firm, the scope of the adjustments that could be made to 
existing component designs became increasingly limited.  
Suppliers also intentionally kept the shapes of interfaces between components 
standardised so that they would at least be assembled together with other standard 
components on the market (Ohara 2004a). This was intended to ensure that suppliers 
would be able to find alternative customers in cases of non-purchase, even if such usage 
failed to maximise overall product performance. Overall, even in terms of mutually 
interacting components, the degree of coordination remained generally limited and 
component designs were not necessarily bespoke to specific customers.  
In summary, arm’s-length, adversarial transactional relations largely mediated by market 
forces came to the aid of the Chinese motorcycle industry in its realisation of 
remarkable levels of price-based competitiveness. The organisational model, however, 
reached a turning point in the 2000s. Its background and ensuing transformation are 
discussed in the next section.  
5. Comparison of Models and Trajectories 
This section compares the two models presented in sections 3 and 4 respectively, and 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses as well as trajectories of change of each.   
                                                   
24 According to Ohara’s (2004a) interviews with 17 Chinese suppliers, 12 admitted that they faced 
substantial risk concerning the possible failure of product development projects. One of them 
described that only about two of the ten product development assignments it had secured from 
manufacturers had succeeded and generated profits while the remaining eight had failed. 
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5.1 Comparison of the Two Models  
Table 2 compares the two organisational models. Under the conventional Japanese 
model, the lead firm engaged in centralised control and extensive intervention in 
governing its relationships with dependent suppliers. In turn, the suppliers were 
expected to endeavour to achieve the targets set, often by ceding autonomy.  
The strength of the Japanese organisational model lay in its capacity to develop 
proprietary products and manufacture them to a high quality standard. In the domain of 
product development, intense interaction involving extensive information sharing with a 
limited number of core component suppliers enabled the lead firm to develop 
proprietary models that were internally and externally coherent (Clark and Fujimoto 
1990). In terms of manufacture, the combination of tight control and generous 
assistance practiced by powerful lead firms helped to extract superior productive 
performance from suppliers that were specialised in narrow manufacturing tasks. 
High-grade supplier performance in manufacturing (and design, for suppliers of core 
components) helped lead firms to launch proprietary models and manufacture them to 
high standards – a key source of their competitiveness. 
Table 2. Comparison of Japanese and Chinese Models 
Feature Japanese  Chinese  
Nature of product/ 
process parameters Non-standard and complex Simple 
Product standards Idiosyncratic: determined by the lead firm 
Endogenously emergent as a result 
of de facto standardisation 
Overall industrial 
structure Concentrated and stable Dispersed and fluid 
Capability distribution Monopolised by the lead firm Basic capabilities widely distributed 
Degree and mechanism 
of coordination 
High: based on lead firm control 
and assistance Low: based on market forces 
Advantages 
High quality and incremental cost 
reduction 
Proprietary product designs with 
high levels of novelty 
Low prices 
Flexibility and speed in launching 
new products 
Disadvantages Rigidity (possible high costs) Long product development cycle Difficulty in product differentiation  
Source: The author.  
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However, the Japanese model also suffered from inherent weaknesses. High quality 
often came at the expense of high costs, as long-term transactions tended to create 
rigidity in lead firm–supplier relationships.25 Even though incremental cost reduction 
via process improvement was an integral element of lead firm requirements of suppliers, 
limited competition between them and the high priority attached to quality standards 
meant that radical price reduction was not possible. This was particularly evident in the 
case of keiretsu suppliers of core components, whereby manufacturers had close 
relations with suppliers via capital and personnel ties.  
The regular renewal of the whole vehicle – the Japanese approach to product 
development – also resulted in extended product development cycles and limited 
flexibility. As of the end of the 1990s to the early 2000s, it generally took a year for 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers to develop new models and the development cycles 
were virtually fixed (Ohara 2001). While the Japanese policy of launching a limited 
number of highly sophisticated models generally worked well in a mature, less volatile 
market, its inability to promptly and flexibly make adjustments to product designs 
inhibited the adaptation of this model to a growing, volatile Chinese market in which 
consumer demand was in a constant state of rapid change.  
Above all, the strength of the arm’s-length model of Chinese industrial organisation lay 
in its capacity to achieve low prices. Low entry barriers for both manufacturers and 
suppliers assisted by de facto standardisation enabled a large number of firms to enter 
into production of motorcycles and components, spurring intense competition. The 
benefits of the arm’s-length model also extended to its speed in launching new models, 
typically ranging between two to three months as of the end of the 1990s (Ohara 2001). 
De facto standardisation of Japanese base models enabled independent suppliers to 
concentrate on design modifications and manufacturing without having to get locked 
into relations or interact intensely with specific customers. In turn, lead firms could 
experiment flexibly with different minor improvements by purchasing and assembling 
various components available in the market.  
However, the Chinese model suffered from limited capacity to achieve differentiation in 
product design and quality, the use of standard components resulting in a proliferation 
                                                   
25 According to a survey of motorcycle component manufacturers in Hamamatsu in 2003 (see 
footnote 19 for details), 52.5% of the 122 respondents had traded with their largest customers since 
establishment and another 44.4% had traded with their largest customers for a considerable length of 
time (Otahara 2006: 112).  
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of largely homogeneous products. To the extent that integral product architecture was 
maintained, repeated duplicative imitation adopting different measuring methods and 
varying degree of precision in reproducing design drawings of the Japanese models 
available in the market meant making compromises in respect of component 
compatibility and precision, while the ad hoc approach to dealing with 
non-compatibility problems only provided partial solutions. At the same time, given 
intense price-based competition and the difficulty of devising measures for monitoring 
product quality, suppliers had little incentive to improve product quality.  
5.2 Trajectories of Change 
While the discussion so far has focussed on the two organisational models in their 
conventional forms, the ways in which they were implemented evolved over time. This 
subsection considers trajectories of change, focussing on recent developments in the 
respective models.  
The two models generally converged in the 2000s, yet fundamental differences still 
remain. In terms of the Japanese system, changes occurred in the degree to which lead 
firms and suppliers were tied into particular relations. During the emergence of 
Japanese supply networks in the 1960s through to the mid-1990s, this organisational 
model was characterised by high levels of lead firm–supplier dependence. Because they 
required competent suppliers, lead firms explicitly sought to develop exclusive ties with 
them by organising supplier associations and providing technical, financial and 
managerial assistance to nurture small, less competent suppliers (Ohtahara 2007; 
Hashino 2007). As supplier competence increased over time, lead firm assistance 
gradually diminished. However, up to the 1990s, lead firms maintained tightly 
organised value chains with exclusive membership, and suppliers became increasingly 
dependent on large, regular orders placed by their main customers (Otahara 2007).  
The Japanese model encountered a turning point around the end of the 1990s. The 
impetus for change came from a sharp decline in motorcycle production in Japan from 
over 7 million units in the early 1980s to 2.3 million – a level at which manufacturers 
found it difficult to place orders that were sufficiently large to sustain their suppliers26 – 
in 1999 (Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 1986, 2006). The declining production in Japan 
                                                   
26 1999 was the first year when the domestic production of Honda, the largest among the four 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers, fell below one million to 846,000 units (Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 
2006).  
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compelled Japanese motorcycle manufacturers to adjust their sourcing practices. For 
example, Honda started encouraging its suppliers to diversify their customer bases and 
become independent.27 While such a strategy was not intended to dismantle 
long-established supplier relations altogether, Honda started to expose incumbent 
suppliers to market forces by partially sourcing components from non-keiretsu suppliers 
in Japan as well as firms based in Southeast Asia.28  
As a result of these changes, tightly integrated networks started to dissipate. However, 
not all actors experienced these developments evenly. Lead firms sounded out new 
suppliers beyond their long-established networks, and this meant that the suppliers – 
even those with capital ties with lead firms – faced intense competition and pressure to 
reduce costs.29 The only exceptions were those equipped with proprietary component 
technologies for which substitutes were difficult to find.30 On the other hand, the 
progress of customer diversification among suppliers remained relatively modest. As of 
2003, 47.3% of 414 Japanese motorcycle component suppliers traded with only one 
manufacturer, whilst 15.5%, 12.8% and 24.4% traded with two, three and four 
manufacturers respectively (Otahara 2005: 21). Again, suppliers of core components 
having proprietary technology are in a relatively better position to explore new 
customers beyond their main clients.31   
Meanwhile, the Chinese model also met with a significant turning point in the early 
2000s. Again, the impetus for transformation came from changes in market demand, 
consumers beginning to seek out higher-quality motorcycles (Ohara 2006a, 2006c). The 
government also implemented stringent quality and environmental standards, and 
cracked down on the infringement of intellectual property rights (ibid.). As a result, the 
sales of low-quality but otherwise faithful copies of Japanese models seriously 
stagnated, and the Chinese market came to be dominated by better-quality products that 
incorporated more sophisticated functional and/or cosmetic modifications to Japanese 
                                                   
27 Interviews with Honda suppliers JJ2 #1 and JJ3 #1.  
28 Interviews with Honda suppliers JJ2 #1 and JJ3 #1. Lecler (1999) and Ahmadjian and Lincoln 
(2001) discuss similar changes in Japanese electronics and car manufacturers. 
29 In spite of enjoying capital relations with Honda, JJ2 and JJ3 faced much stiffer competition as 
they only possessed competencies that could be easily sourced (interviews with Honda suppliers JJ2 
#1 and JJ3 #1). 
30 JJ1 possessed complementary product technologies and continued to receive 100% of Honda’s 
orders (interview #1).  
31 According to the author’s calculation based on IRC (2009), as many as 17 of 42 suppliers 
(equivalent of 40% – substantially higher than the average ratio noted in the text) having direct 
capital relations with Honda traded with all of the four Japanese motorcycle manufacturers. JJ1 was 
a typical example of such suppliers (interview #1).   
30 
 
base models, a trend that called for a higher degree of lead firm–supplier coordination 
(ibid.).  
Corresponding changes occurred in industrial structure and organisation. In contrast to 
the dispersed industrial structure of the 1990s, the industry was consolidated in the 
2000s under a smaller number of relatively large motorcycle manufacturers with the 
capacity to engage in research and development (R&D) for design modifications, and 
the manufacturing capability to achieve better product quality. The market data show 
limited changes in the names of the top companies between 2001 and 200532 (Ohara 
2006c).  
As market requirements came to necessitate a higher level of coordination around 
product and/or process parameters, industrial organisation also started to shift away 
from the arm’s-length pattern towards one characterised by higher levels of lead firm 
coordination. Ohara’s (2006c) surveys from 2001 to 2004 confirm some signs that lead 
firm–supplier relations became characterised by closer interaction and mutual 
dependence. For example, transactions between major lead firms and their suppliers 
stabilised, with fewer instances of switching partners, and the former started to partially 
or wholly bear the cost of model-specific investment in dies and moulds. However, the 
same study suggests the limits of such transformation. Multiple sourcing persisted, 
albeit among a smaller number of suppliers; lead firms and suppliers engaged in limited 
systematic sharing of information; and lead firms still lacked the will and capacity to 
provide technical assistance to their suppliers (ibid.). This suggests that transactions 
continued to be mediated to a considerable extent by market forces.  
In summary, both Japanese and Chinese models underwent important transformations in 
the 2000s, primarily in response to changing market and competitive environments. 
However, fundamental differences between the two models remained to a considerable 
extent, as organisational transformation was constrained by the existing alignment of 
capabilities in each country. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper set out to enquire into the form of industrial organisation that enabled 
Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to challenge the dominance of Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers which had remained intact for nearly four decades. The above discussion 
                                                   
32 These include Grand River, Lifan, Loncin, Zongshen and Sudiro Honda (Ohara 2006c).  
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has demonstrated that Chinese manufacturers did indeed develop a distinctive form of 
industrial organisation that enabled them to attain types of competitiveness strikingly 
different from those of the Japanese industry leaders. Up to the early 1990s, the 
conventional Japanese model of industrial organisation proved resilient in serving the 
mature and sophisticated motorcycle markets of the developed world. Given intricate 
relations between the overall vehicle and components typical of products with integral 
architecture, a high degree of explicit coordination was required by lead firms to 
achieve incremental product and process improvements (Ohara 2006d). 
In contrast, the strength of the Chinese model lay in its capacity to achieve low prices, 
flexibility, and speed of adjustment. This paper has explained the emergence of 
arm’s-length linkages in the Chinese motorcycle industry in terms of two variables. The 
first was de facto standardisation of popular Japanese models, which progressed through 
endogenous, uncoordinated moves on the part of numerous assemblers and suppliers. 
Notably, this allowed dispersed, arm’s-length linkages to emerge even in the absence of 
changes to the integral design architecture.  
The second was the wide distribution of basic reverse engineering and manufacturing 
capabilities that had accumulated during the long history of industrial development in 
China. With its strength in the production of large quantities of low-priced imitations of 
popular Japanese models, the arm’s-length organisational model enabled Chinese 
motorcycle manufacturers to capture the lion’s share of the huge yet volatile domestic 
market, in which consumers prioritised low prices and where intellectual property rights 
were only weakly protected.  
By drawing on the emerging body of empirical research into the Chinese motorcycle 
industry, this paper has taken a first important step in conceptualising the distinctive 
form of industrial organisation emerging in China in explicit comparison with the 
conventional Japanese model. The revised version of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) framework 
of GVC governance theory was crucial in explaining why contrasting models emerged 
in Japan and China and why they changed over time.  
However, further research is necessary to explore the relevance of the model to other 
industries and settings. First, there is the question of whether such a model is specific to 
the motorcycle industry or whether it may be observed in other Chinese industries. The 
emerging body of research in the field seems to suggest the latter may indeed be the 
case, in showing that arm’s-length linkages between large numbers of lead firms and 
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suppliers have prevailed in the mobile telephone handset, liquid crystal display (LCD) 
television, and car industries (Imai and Shiu 2011; Shintaku et al. 2009; Marukawa 
2007).  
The case of the car industry deserves particular attention because, similar to the 
motorcycle industry, the Chinese approach to the de facto standardisation of existing 
products has given rise to loosely coordinated organisation in an industry in which 
integral product architecture has long acted as a major obstacle to breaking centralised 
organisation within developed country contexts (Sturgeon et al. 2008). The next 
important step in this line of research is to integrate the growing number of 
industry-level case studies to investigate whether there are indeed common Chinese 
patterns across industries. The organisational model conceptualised in this paper could 
well provide an appropriate starting point for such an attempt.  
Second, there is the question of whether the Chinese model can be transferred to 
different contexts. The existing literature shows that the Japanese model has not only 
been transplanted by the country’s lead firms via FDI but has also been emulated and 
adapted by Japan’s competitors (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 1992; Helper and 
Sako 1995; Kaplinsky 1995; Posthuma 1995a, 1995b; Harriss 1995; Humphrey et al. 
1998). Whilst there have not been any serious attempts to tackle this question in relation 
to the Chinese model, the analysis in the present paper suggests a number of focal issues 
for future research in this direction.  
Contrary to the case with the Japanese model, the limited degree of lead firm 
coordination inherent in the Chinese model implies that its transplantation abroad may 
not be driven primarily by the engagement of lead firms in FDI. In fact, the expansion 
of Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to locations outside China has thus far occurred 
mainly in the form of exports without long-term commitment to engage in local 
production (Ohara et al. 2003). This suggests that the possibility of the Chinese model 
being replicated outside the country depends largely on the distribution of basic reverse 
engineering and manufacturing capabilities in host countries, as well as their ability to 
demonstrate the entrepreneurial dynamism necessary to seize new business 
opportunities – both of which are the most striking features of Chinese industrial 
development.  
The most promising candidate for this line of research is probably Vietnam, which 
experienced massive inflows of Chinese motorcycle imports as early as the turn of the 
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century (Cohen 2002; Fujita 2011). Further study is necessary to determine whether the 
Chinese model itself was transferred to Vietnam as a consequence and, if so, what 
impact this had on Vietnam’s industrial development.  
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